INTRODUCTION
In recent years marriage and divorce have again become the focus of a debate which has attracted and digested in varying degrees the contributions of academics, practitioners, politicians, religious leaders and the popular press. It has resulted in a series of official documents from the Inter-departmental Committee's Report on Conciliation in 1983 through the Law Commission Working Papers to the White Paper on Divorce Reform 1 and, now, Parts I and II of the Family Law Bill 1995. It has been argued that the proposed legislation does not pay sufficient attention to the interests of children. James and Lyon note that "although there are now in excess of 160,000 children under the age of 16 each year who experience the divorce of their parents, the White Paper contains in total little more than two pages referring to the needs of children in divorce", supporting their contention that there is an "almost complete absence of discussion concerning children" in the White Paper. 2 However, the scattered passages which make up those two pages and the similar references in the preceding Consultation Paper, 3 can be interpreted quite differently if quantity is not the yardstick for importance. Instead I will argue that the child of divorcing parents is given that the preceding Consultation Paper 14 had repeated the assertion of the Law Commission
Report The Ground for Divorce that "The children would usually prefer their parents to stay together". 15 However, "where divorce is unavoidable" the objectives of the proposals are: "... to minimise the bitterness and hostility between the parties and to reduce the trauma for the children; and to keep to the minimum the cost to the parties and the taxpayer". 16 It is later made clear that there is a relationship between the two parts of this fourth objective:
... it is conflict between the parents which has been linked to greater social and behavioural problems among children rather than the separation and divorce itself. A reduction in bitterness and hostility was seen by consultees as a central objective in reducing the harm that might be done to children of the marriage.
17
A divorce process based on a requirement to reflect rather than recriminate will help to reduce conflict and encourage cooperation, which will in turn minimise the distress caused to children.
18
Conflict is harmful to children and the Government is of the view that the reduction of conflict should be high on the list of objectives for a good divorce process. 19 Therefore, the aim of conflict reduction is justified because of the damage to children 20 and the greater use of mediation is justified because it will reduce conflict. Consultees considered that, in general, the advantages of mediation outweighed its disadvantages. Advantages included the reduction of conflict between the couple leading to a reduction in trauma for the children. 21 The Government agrees that bitterness and hostility are reduced through the mediation process and couples are helped to manage conflict to the benefit of their children and themselves.
22
Mediation is also encouraged because it teaches parental communication and because it promotes parental responsibility 23 -both deemed to further the child's welfare. The focus on the reduction of hostility for the benefit of the child also supports the proposal for a "first port of call" which is essentially an information giving session:
The Government is of the view that couples need a better understanding ... of the effects of divorce on children before their marriage is dissolved. ... As discussed earlier, reduction and management of conflict is essential if the effects of divorce on children are to be minimised. It is equally important, however, for parents to be informed about their continuing parental responsibility, what this means, and how to deal with children who are suffering distress as a result of the breakdown in their parents' marriage. 24 It is, therefore, possible to argue that a quite specific understanding of the child's nature and needs is conveyed. This representation of the child as a vulnerable person who does not want her parents to divorce, who is damaged by both the process of divorce and its consequences and who is powerless to affect the divorce process dominates both the Consultation Paper and the White
Paper and provides justification for the key proposals in these documents and resulting proposals for legislation. In effect, the debate surrounding divorce reform has led to the emergence of a `popular' and powerful image of the child as `the victim' of divorce, that is, as a passive participant in the divorce process and one needing protection from the consequences of divorce.
THE CHILD AS VICTIM
This image of the child as a victim, to be protected without qualification by the legal system and other institutions regulated by law because he or she holds no responsibility for a damaging situation, is not novel. In medieval and early modern England such protection had been confined largely to those minors who owned property and who were perceived as the victims of rapacious guardians. Whilst, therefore, the court "historically regarded itself as the protector of the minor against the manipulation of adults", 26 for propertyless children, the majority, the "long tradition of the court's right to protect children against adult exploitation" 27 required the creation of offences and the imposition of duties by legislation, notably the Tudor Poor Laws, nineteenth century factory and mines regulations and, since the Prevention of Cruelty to and Protection of Children Act 1889, the labelling of cruelty to children as a specific criminal act. In the context of legislation over the last 150 years, therefore, the child has been perceived and `processed' principally as a victim, to whom attributions of culpability and responsibility are not possible, when the child is a victim of assault and abuse and, specifically, a victim of parental failure and cruelty or a victim of ill treatment by an employer. 28 Within legal communications, therefore, the concept of the child as a victim to be protected operates as a particular `semantic artifact', 29 one of several "constructs ... produced by the legal discourse itself" 30 which avoid the need to deal with all the complexities and contradictions which are inherent in a `real' child and which `fit' into law's own procedures and functions.
31
Yet this analysis is misleading if it suggests an unproblematic link between the existence of offences or duties which carry the potential to construct a child as victim and the availability of powerful images of children as victim in, say, a political discourse. For example, despite the growth of victimology 32 and the developing policy emphasis on victims of crime, [T] here is very little mention of children as victims of crime. The victimization of children is seen solely in terms of child abuse, physical and sexual. ... The term `child abuse` is used to describe acts which may fail to be recorded as crime, and such cases may be diverted out of the criminal justice process into civil protection proceedings. As a result, interest and concern about child victimization has developed largely outside a criminological framework ... . So often what happens to children is not labelled in such a way that a criminal offence is denoted -evident, for example, in the references to `abuse' rather than `assault', regardless of whether criminal or civil proceedings are contemplated. The current image of the child as victim of crime may be modified by attention, for example, to bullying in schools 34 and to secondary victimisation in relation to domestic violence, 35 but it is still a relatively narrow construction. 36 In addition, those offences committed against children which are processed as crimes may be dealt with in ways which accord less importance to them because the impact of crime is assessed in relation to adult criteria. So, for example, Morgan and Zedner discuss bicycle theft which does not usually lead to a high level of police response because of the relatively low level of monetary value involved and yet, for a child, may mean the theft of their most valuable possession, possibly having been `earned' and having facilitated independence.
There are two obvious reasons why this has happened: a focus on the `welfare of the child', with social work `control' of child abuse, and the lack of any "political impetus" for recognition of the needs of child victims more generally. 37 The resulting "tendency to marginalise children as victims of crime" 38 has practical implications: children are denied the benefits of recognition as victims of acts that, if committed against adults, would be labelled as criminal. Denunciation of the offender does not occur or is not public (for example where abuse leads to care not criminal proceedings) and there are no `victim support' services. This marginalisation of children as victims of crime has also contributed to the development of a popular image of the child who, inter alia, offends, which is almost exclusively an image of the child `as offender'. As a result there is no prevalent image of the child as perpetrator and victim of crime despite research which
shows that the categories of children who offend and children who are victims of crime "are not mutually exclusive but are often products of each other". 39 For example, "being an offender puts individuals in situations which ensure that they are more likely to be victims of crime than the rest of the population".
VICTIMS OF PARENTAL HOSTILITY
The development of a powerful image of the child `as victim' in relation to divorce reform is, therefore, of greater significance because in only a limited range of circumstances and situations has there been a relevant consensus that a child should be protected through state policy and action, notwithstanding conflicting adult interests. In addition, comparatively rarely is public policy based on the image of the child as victim. The current intense debate in the UK on educational policy, for example, is conducted almost entirely around concepts of parental rights and societal needs (for a flexible workforce or `disciplined' youth). Yet in relation to divorce, whilst the Consultation and White Papers reveal a political consensus on the nature and universality of the harm, it is far from clear there is societal consensus that divorce is a social problem or that it is a problem for the reasons constituted in the political documents. The assumptions which underlie the government's proposals draw on a different consensus -one which has emerged in the last two decades among child welfare professionals through their acceptance of the likelihood that the child, during and after parental separation, is psychologically harmed by inter-parental hostility and lack of contact with one of her parentsthe latter harm being assumed to follow the former.
Research and professional experience in the social and `psy' sciences suggests a complex picture of family life after parental separation. In ` What is interesting is that a particular professional consensus is now endorsed and communicated so enthusiastically and unequivocally in policy documents and judicial comment.
It was the much more general concern of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, reporting in 1956, about the effects on children of the disruption of family life and a lack of confidence that parents could safely be left to make arrangements when emotionally affected by their divorce 43 that led to the requirement that the court should oversee arrangements for all children of divorcing parents (now section 41 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973). The
Robinson Report in the early 1980s also noted in broad terms: "It is accepted on all sides that the consequences of marriage breakdown and divorce are at best unpleasant for the spouses and the children and at worst productive of serious and prolonged anguish and of injury to children".
44
The more recent Consultation Paper in its Foreword was more specific, "Such damage [to children of the marriage] is particularly likely where the marriage has ended in bitterness and where the children do not have a continuing reasonable relationship thereafter with both parents". 45 The White Paper makes the point even clearer: it is conflict between the parents which has been linked to greater social and behavioral problems among children ... A reduction in bitterness and hostility was seen by consultees as a central objective in reducing the harm that might be done to children of the marriage. 46 The influence of an increasingly narrow version of that perceived professional consensus is also evident in the rhetorical question of Judge Pearce, made in relation to the Children Act 1989:
"The prime objective is, and always has been, the best interest of the child. The rest follows on because what could be better for the child than to have parents and other carers sharing parental responsibility and ordering their family affairs by agreement?". 47 This image of the child as the victim of parents in conflict is, therefore, not confined to the divorce reform documents -it has also underpinned recent legislation, notably the Children Act 1989. As Roche argues, "Part of the agenda behind the Act was ... the idea of children as `victims' of their parents' divorce".
48
"Increasingly children were seen as the innocent victims of adult-relationship breakdown" 49 and law's role was to be that of "lowering the stakes" in the parental battles, again to reduce interparental conflict. To achieve that the Act created a new legal concept of parental responsibility, 50 giving a power to all married parents which is inalienable except via adoption proceedings and which has been `marketed' as facilitating the reduction of parental hostility and the encouragement of cooperative parenting.
51
The idea of the child as victim of parental conflict is also evident in judicial comments in relation to custody (residence) and access (contact) cases over the last two decades 52 and, arguably, more so since the implementation of the Children Act 1989. 53 Even though legislation has given parents the right to ask the court to order contact (when the care-giving parent is either denying any contact or contact in the form requested), courts have maintained a legal fiction -that contact is the right of the child -which feeds into the representation of the child as a victim if not in contact with both parents.
54
Access should be regarded as a basic right of the child ... no court should deprive a child of access unless it was wholly satisfied that it was in the interests of that child that access should cease.
55
The starting point, always, is that every child has a right to be brought up in the knowledge of his non-custodial parent. That is a right which the courts are determined to preserve ... Their right to have their welfare served by re-establishing contact with their father at the earliest possible moment requires that the fullest attention should now be given [to that], with the best possible legal and medical help available ... .
56
What has occurred is that the relatively narrow popular and legal images of the child as victim have been reconstructed, but not to embrace victimisation by any adult or child committing against her any crime, including those offences relating to children and adults alike. Rather, it has been extended to include victimisation from another form of parental `abuse'. To the `popular' image of the child as victim of physical or sexual abuse has been added the child as victim of inter-parental hostility and of emotional abuse. So powerful is this recent conceptualisation of the child as victim of parental separation and conflict that, as Jones and
Parkinson have noted in relation to the child's contact with the `absent' parent, "there has been in the past a discernible reluctance of courts in England, Australia and elsewhere, to deny access entirely" even when the parent-child relationship had involved sexual abuse -that other great danger in available images of child victims. 57 
MAKING PARENTS RESPONSIBLE
Policy documents have conveyed the message that the existence of the potential danger of conflict induced trauma is proven by a large amount of recent research which suggests that divorce may produce children who are more likely to be unhappy, to underachieve and to become criminals than peers whose parents stay together or who live cooperatively after divorce. 58 That message is also conveyed by `parent education' courses. These programmes, developed in conjunction with courts and mediation services, have been running in parts of the USA for some years and there is now a rapid proliferation. 59 They have been set up as a response to the belief that "uninformed parents are unwittingly using their children and the courts to `get back at' recalcitrant spouses" 60 and aim to motivate parents to reduce their hostility towards each other and refrain from taking disputes to court. "They ... provide an early intervention for parents who want to act in the best interests of their children but need education to do so". 61 In the UK the Department of Health has produced a Parenting Initiative 62 which includes funding for action projects, as a result of which two mediation services (Coventry and Sussex Family Mediation Services) have been grant-aided to design and pilot an educational pack for parents attending mediation. 63 The assumption that there exists -unproblematically -a body of relevant knowledge is also made in the White Paper's use of the term `information' in regard to what is to be conveyed at the first port of call for all those intending to divorce. "This will introduce parties to the benefits of marriage guidance and counselling, [and] provide information about the emotional, psychological, financial and legal aspects of separation and divorce and its effects on parents and children". 64 The only noted concerns expressed in responses to the Lord Chancellor's Department on this issue are "that the provision of information should not overstep the boundary into advice giving", specifically legal advice giving, and, that "the form of information giving must be entirely objective". 65 The response to neither concern allows of the possibility that the `facts' to be conveyed about the process and effects of child adjustment to parental separation are less than fully proven by `scientific' research and that the research, though voluminous, would not support so restricted an image of the child as victim, mainly or exclusively, of parental conflict as that which has become so authoritative in the 1990s. In 1983 Freeman had stated: `When compared with children who have suffered bereavement, it seems that children from homes who have suffered marital disruption encounter hardships considerably more frequently" 66 but the possible range of `hardships' which could lead to the victimisation of the child were at that stage of the debate not subsumed in `conflict reduction'. Research has since shown, for example that a major hardship in the lives of families after divorce is poverty. 67 Research has also revealed the extent of spousal abuse and the likelihood that a good proportion of divorcing mothers have suffered violence 68 which their children have witnessed. 69 In practice children may be victims of contact rather than lack of contact. 70 Furthermore the results of research focusing on the effects of parental conflict and separation may not be as conclusive and clear cut as statements in recent policy documents suggest. 71 Policy in relation to divorce is being influenced by associations between divorce and, for example, educational attainment, criminal activity and employment which do not adequately address `third factor' hypotheses. As Burghes concludes on reviewing research evidence, `Because the children of intact marriages fare better on average than those who experience separation and divorce, does not mean that preventing the latter would create better outcomes associated with the former'.
72
The finding of the Exeter Family Study that `family re-ordering(s) had the strongest association with poor outcomes for children' 73 had great public impact 74 but must be set alongside research like that of Elliott and Richards who have shown that conditions often pre-exist the divorce. In the latter study children whose parents divorced when they were aged 7-16 obtained worse scores for each of their four outcome measures than those whose parents remained married but `this was the case at age sixteen after the parental divorce but also at age seven before the parental divorce' [my italics]. 75 This is not to imply that the research about the psychological harm children may suffer should not be taken seriously. However, there is a strong case that the proposed reforms are not a comprehensive response to such knowledge and will not, therefore, adequately address the interests of children. 76 The selective reconstruction, within legal and political discourses, of results of research conducted within the `psy' and social sciences does not include the complexities found in the discussion of such research in scientific journals and does not acknowledge the existence of other `information' about children of divorcing parents. Yet, because the major source of victimisation in legal and political communications is now taken to be that of inter-parental hostility, the sole response is an attempt to reduce parental hostility and promote joint parenting. It is, perhaps, stating the obvious that there are very clear political benefits to the existence of this particular image of the child. In relation to proposed divorce reform, the focus on the child as victim -and parental hostility as the cause of the child's suffering -allows for a policy of mediation rather than the use of solicitors because mediation is seen as a more effective way of reducing hostility and encouraging cooperation. It justifies a move from at the same time, a fault-based divorce law to a process over time and is thought to be a cheaper process than the current usage of lawyers and courts, thereby addressing the problem of the mounting Legal Aid bill. Without a clear image of the child as victim of parental conflict the divorce reforms proposed would be too difficult to `sell', challenging as they do professional, religious and political interests. 77 There are other economic and political benefits accruing from the current prevailing image of the child as victim of divorce. Had that image not become so powerful, other images of the child as victim in these circumstances might have been more influential. Without a more widely available image of the child as victim of an abusing `absent' parent it is the `implacably hostile' mother who continues to be the bogey`man' of family law: hostility is deemed to have no justification even in the context of (fear of) violence. Furthermore, a focus on the benefits for children of 'stability' would require a range of social welfare policies to ensure greater stability of family life rather than `a time to reflect'. 78 These policies have much more onerous financial implications and do not fit in with the principle of minimal state intervention. If images of children rooted in other `dangers' in the situation of parental separation had become more widely available and authoritative the corresponding response would have included much more than divorce mediation and, crucially, would not have placed such stress on the responsibility of parents.
Information-giving programmes and mediation processes may have been designed to help children and may result in an improvement in the lives of at least some children but the strategy is to reduce conflict by inducing parental guilt. into and reinforce the current political ideology of the family.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN
The image of the child, in relation to parental separation, as victim of hostile, non-cooperative and uncommunicative parents has thus become a semantic artefact of clear utility in the political as well as the legal discourse by enabling family policy to be based on a placing of responsibility for victimisation of the child at the door of one or both parents. 81 The problem is of course that these prevailing images of children as victims -so useful to policy makers and professional practice -are unlikely to lead to a reformed divorce process and aftermath which are much `better' for the children involved. Not only is the nature of the victimisation constructed very narrowly but the image of the child as victim of divorce is kept quite distinct from other images of children, for example the child as victim of paternal abuse or victim of poverty (though the child as potential offender is used to strengthen the idea of the child as victim of divorce) and can only be sustained by particular images of parents. The focus on parental action to remove or reduce `victimisation' caused by parental conflict is sustained by an image of parents capable of cooperation and communication via `reflection' and `mediation'. In so far as this image is authoritative then those other available images, for example of parents incapable of joint parenting and as capable of using contact for abusing ex-partner or child, are not reconstructed for use within political and legal discourses.
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The White Paper discourages the juxtaposition of different images by discussing separately the issue of domestic violence in a chapter dealing with "Related Areas of Family Law and Procedure". 83 The Consultation Paper had previously explained that one objective of the reforms "would be to separate the divorce process and matters relating to children, home and maintenance from other matters such as molestation and violence by removing the jurisdiction to grant injunctions for molestation and violence ancillary to divorce proceedings" 84 because the process to divorce "is a separate matter". 85 This constituting domestic violence as an issue not properly relevant to the divorce process allows the idea that parental cooperation is possible -a necessary precondition for the existence of `a continuing but separated' 86 traditional family which is the ideological basis of current policy. This means that policy and practice are underpinned by fragmented, partial and compartmentalised images of children which can only disadvantage real children. The welfare of children has been identified so closely with the reduction of conflict that mediation is equated with welfare. As James says, "The welfare principle is reflected in the implicit assumption that encouraging parental responsibility and decision-making, thereby reducing conflict, is the best way of ensuring that the child's welfare is met".
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But there is another, perhaps even more important, corollary. As Thane pointed out in relation to late nineteenth and twentieth century legislation, "A succession of statutes ... have striven to protect children from neglect and ill-treatment by parents and guardians ... However at no time was it thought necessary to give children independent voices in such proceedings". 88 This has been changing, particularly in relation to issues of compulsory care and medical decisions where children are being heard and, sometimes, those voices are determinative of outcome. 89 Nevertheless, the child of divorce is being portrayed almost exclusively as victim, a potential detriment as the `survivors' of child sexual abuse and domestic violence have made clear in their rejection of the label of victim. 90 The label inhibits discussion as to whether, in relation to the divorce process, the child should have anything other than a passive role. Instead the image could be that of `legal actor' and legislation could recognise the autonomy rights of the child 91 rather than her `right' to be protected 92 but debate, now familiar in many areas of child-related law and practice, about `balancing' liberationist and protectionist rights for children, has not yet taken place in relation to divorce law. The idea that separating parents protect their children and must be left free to do so has been largely unchallenged in recent debates. But, as Roche points out, the family and community can act to the disadvantage of children and the "recognition of the possibility of the child having interests which are independent of family and community leads us to a consideration of how such interests might be expressed and how the wider community should respond to such a voice". 93 This consideration has been precluded in relation to divorce by the construction of only one `independent' image of the child -that of the child `battered' by parental conflict. The child rarely has needs voiced other than those relating to inter-parental conflict and rarely has a status other than that of victim. Roche therefore makes the timely point that "the issue now is one, not of establishing the principle of children's rights, but of extending the range of situations where the language is perceived as legitimate" (1995, p. 292). 94 This criticism that the child is being given no independent voice in the divorce process and that divorce reform proposals do not give sufficient priority to the welfare of the child has led to a response from within the mediation movement, a response already apparent in the USA where strategies for `empowering' children "to reduce children's victimisation and enable them to emerge as winners" are already being discussed and implemented. 95 With such a crucial role for mediation in the reform proposals mediators have little option but to develop ways in which the welfare of the child, and indeed her rights, can be addressed in the process of mediation without undermining the fundamental premise of mediation that it allows parent control and determination of outcome. 96 So National Family Mediation (NFM) in 1993-4 conducted a study of the views and practices amongst mediators in regard to the role of children in mediation. Their
Report concluded: In relation to arrangements for children, the perspective of those children is a crucial part of the information necessary for decision-making. This information can be introduced into the mediation in two ways: i. by parents themselves or ii. by direct consultation with children within the process. Whether children should be consulted directly, how or at what stage in the process are matters to be agreed jointly by the mediators and parties. 97 Therefore NFM has devised new training schemes for mediators to help parents consult their children or mediators to `consult' children directly. 98 Yet, as Richards points out, this innovation "cannot square a circle" as "there is no way in which they could use information that a child may
give them without destroying their own neutral position".
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The attempt to provide the child with an active role in a scheme developed with an image of the child as victim may be doomed to failure and it may be that the child as legal actor should not necessarily supplant the child as victim in this context. 100 Furthermore, as Fox Harding points out, "a stress on children as independent actors may in fact be a smoke screen used to legitimate the withdrawal of the state from responsibility for the upbringing and maintenance of them".
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Instead of such a polarised discussion two possibilities need further consideration. First that there may be understandings of children and their needs other than that of the child as victim of parental conflict and that these images may have quite different implications. Secondly, that the image of an abstract child may be so powerful that it inhibits or prevents discussion of the needs of the actual child, that is the child who becomes the focus of procedures. 102 At the very least, therefore, Roche's comment that "Children are talked about. What needs to change is how they are talked about and how children can connect with and participate in such conversations" 103 should be relevant in relation to discussions of divorce reform.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
These discussions require a clearer theoretical perspective on what brings people to see children and families in particular ways: how and why our images of children are developed, and how, as a result, concern is expressed, by those operating within one or more social systems, about particular `harms' to children. As King has argued, Taking, as we have done, the starting point of harm to children, it is then possible, using a closed system approach, to examine how each of these systems, which are treated by society as authoritative, understands and gives meaning to communications from other systems concerning `harm to children'.
King is arguing on the basis of autopoietic theory but a similar message is given by Rex and Wendy Stainton Rogers in their book subtitled "Shifting Agendas of Child Concern" which takes a polytextualist approach to the analysis of discourse relating to 'child concern'. A critical polytextualist analysis of these discourses seeks to address them as socially constructed ... stories, and to pursue child concern within the recognition that it belongs to and cannot be separated from the social-tectonics of social thinking in general terms. It offers not an understanding of children concern per se so much as a concern about concern. ... we believe it is crucial to be able to highlight and discuss the child oppressive potentials of each, without being immediately accused either of merely attacking the well-meaningness of those who argue for them, or of failing to acknowledge the danger of our challenge. 105 As the authors point out in their concluding chapter, the alternative, "To embark on a crusading quest for villains", is an exercise which puts its operator "within a chimerical fairy-tale world in which, once the brave knight has slain the dragon, children can all live `happily ever after'". consisted of whatever could not be explained using the programmes available to the system, but, nevertheless, had to be acknowledged as existing.
107
A phenomenon `known' in one closed system is `unknowable' (noise) in another system 108 with the result that policies are based on a simplified vision. They may also be based on a distorted vision. Currently, the image of the child of divorcing parents which is conveyed through legal and political communications relies on knowledge reconstructed from systems external to law and politics. This gives the impression that there is a consensus across systems of law, politics, economics and the social and medical sciences but this masks differences in meaning and authority. 25. This image has been strengthened by an amendment to the Family Law Bill 1995 conceded by the Lord Chancellor so that the hardship bar to divorce existing in current and proposed divorce law will be modified to refer to `substantial' (instead of `grave') financial or other hardship and to children as well as the spouse. Though this has significance within the context of this discussion it may not have much practical significance given the marginal applicability and use of the current provision. 
54.
In legal communications, the image of the child as victim of divorced or divorcing parents is further defined by a particular construction of the victimising parent. Such a parent is not the `absent' parent who does not seek or maintain contact but rather the custodial parent who is `implacably hostile' to contact and refuses to cooperate in arrangements for contact. This cannot solely be explained by the lack of procedures to enforce contact on non-custodial parents but rather by an over-riding aim to remove, not create, parental conflict. (See Piper op cit n 52).
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